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Does Europe Need Neutrality?
The Old Continent in Search of Identity
Andrea Pin∗
INTRODUCTION
One of the most debated issues that European legal thinkers are
tackling is surely the place that “neutrality” has in the field of
constitutional theory, state-religion relationships, and human rights. 1
This is an extremely hot issue across the Old Continent. A vast
portion of European legal culture thinks that neutrality 2 is needed to
protect religious freedom for all, as well as to protect human rights
from threats that derive from religious extremism: believers,
nonbelievers and democracies alike would be protected by
neutrality. 3
Some European states are debating or have already legislated in
this field in recent years. For example, due to its national version of
neutrality, France prohibited the use of ostensible religious symbols
at schools 4 and, later, the use of the complete Muslim veil in public
places. 5 Along similar lines, Switzerland passed a constitutional

∗ Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law, University of Padova (Italy). The
author is deeply grateful to the International Center for Law and Religion Studies for inviting
him to its 2013 Symposium and especially to Brett Scharffs and Cole Durham, and wishes to
thank Mark Hill QC, Mark Movsesian, and Enzo Pace for their extremely insightful comments
and suggestions. Special thanks go also to James Heilpern. The author welcomes comments at
andrea.pin@unipd.it.
1. J. HABERMAS, FATTI E NORME. CONTRIBUTI A UNA TEORIA DISCORSIVA DEL
DIRITTO E DELLA DEMOCRAZIA 363–66 (L. Ceppa ed., Guerini e associati 1996) [hereinafter
CONTRIBUTI].
2. See, e.g., J. BAUBÉROT & M. MILOT, LAÏCITÉS SANS FRONTIÈRES (2011;); L.
ZUCCA, A SECULAR EUROPE (Oxford University Press, 2012) [hereinafter SECULAR EUROPE];
CONTRIBUTI, supra note 1, at 366.
3. BAUBÉROT & MILOT, supra note 2, at 76.
4. LOI 2004-228 du 15 Mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et
lycées publics [Law 2004–228 of March 15, 2004 Regulating, in Accordance with the
Principle of Secularism, the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing Denoting Religious Affiliation in
Schools, Colleges and Public Schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190.
5. LOI 2010-1192 du 11 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
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referendum
banning
the
establishment
of
Minarets, 6
notwithstanding the fact that religious freedom policies in
Switzerland are generally left to cantons, not to the Federation. 7
Italy had to deal with state neutrality when a case about the display
of the crucifix in public school classrooms was brought before
domestic courts and, later, before the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECtHR”). 8
The issue of neutrality goes beyond the state level. It has been
precisely because of the ECtHR’s case law that neutrality has become
part of the framework of the European Convention of Human
Rights: the ECtHR has used the neutrality principle in many
situations concerning disparate cases such as conscientious
objections 9 or religious communities’ autonomy. 10
But in a broader sense, the doctrine of neutrality has also
significantly influenced the European Union. It was especially
influential when members of the European Union discussed whether
they should explicitly mention Europe’s religious roots in the
preamble of what should have been the European Constitution but
later became a less daring European Treaty. 11 The use of neutrality
therefore encompasses the whole spectrum of the relationship
between religion and human rights, including the place that religion
has in the public place, the relationship between democracy and

l’espace public [Law 2010–1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Concealment of the
Face in Public Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010.
6. The referendum, which was held November 29, 2009, amended article No. 72 of
the Swiss Constitution, introducing the following amendment atto the third paragraph: “The
construction of minarets is prohibited.” CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION]
Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art. 72, ¶ 3 (Switz.).
7. CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art.
72, ¶¶ 1–3 (Switz.) (“The regulation of the relationship between the church and the state is
the responsibility of the Cantons. The Confederation and the Cantons may within the scope of
their powers take measures to preserve public peace between the members of different religious
communities. The construction of minarets is prohibited.”).
8. Lautsi v. Italy App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (summarizing the Italian
domestic decisions in this topic).
9. See, e.g., Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
10. See, e.g., Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 Eur.
Ct. H.R (2001).
11. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Christian Europe? Europe and Christianity: Rules of
Commitment, 6 EUR. VIEW 1, 143–50 (2007).
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religion, the rights of believers, freedom from religion for
nonbelievers, and autonomy of religious groups. 12
One thing can be stated clearly from the very beginning, the
enforcement of neutrality doesn’t come at a cheap price, as recent
pieces of state legislation demonstrate. Neutrality can be very
demanding, both for religions and for human rights, as proven by
the French prohibition of the Muslim veil and of religious symbols.
It is not by chance that such enforcement of neutrality in France has
ignited religious conflicts in that country, 13 rather than extinguishing
them. 14
The task of this Article is precisely to highlight some of the
reasons for which neutrality has become common currency in
European legal thinking. For these reasons, the Article first sketches
in Part I, the fields in which neutrality appears to play a major—and
sometimes unpredictable—role. More precisely, it first focuses on the
European Convention of Human Rights, its wording, and the
ECtHR’s case law (Part I.A); then it considers the debate about the
preamble of the proposed Constitution of the European Union 15
(Part I.B); and it briefly summarizes the evolution of some states that
have embraced neutrality (Part I.C). Then it explores the reasons for
which neutrality is oftentimes invoked, mostly at a supranational
level, and links this phenomenon to the characters of European
societies (Part II). Finally, it briefly explores the difficulties as well as
12. B. MASSIGNON & V. RIVA, L’EUROPE, AVEC OU SANS DIEU? HÉRITAGES ET
269 (Les Editions de L’Atelier-Fidélité, 2010).
13. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and
France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 479 (2004).
14. See the caseload that the ECtHR has come to face after France passed the 2004
piece of legislation banning the use of religious symbols at school; Dogru v. France, App. No.
27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Kervanci v. France, app. n, App. No. 31645/04 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2004); Ghazal v. France, App. No. 29134/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Jasvir Singh v.
France, App. No. 25463/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Ranjit Singh v. France, App. No.
27561/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Hatice Bayrak v. France, App. No. 14308/08 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2009); Mahmud Sadek Gamaleddyn v. France, App. No. 18527/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009);
Tuba Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); S.A.S. v. France, App. No.
43835/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).
15. The drafted Constitution never entered into force; however, almost all its provisions
later became the body of the so-called Lisbon Treaty, signed December 13, 2007. Treaty of
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon], available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0001:0010:EN:PDF
(last
visited Aug. 16, 2013).
NOUVEAUX DÉFIS
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the implications of preferring the paradigm of “pluralism” instead of
neutrality (Part III).
The hypothesis of this Article is that neutrality is expected to fill
a vacuum in the constitutional identity of contemporary Europe and
to give shape to a new society. Neutrality is not just a common
standard for religious freedom’s protection; it is also a tool that is
used to legitimize European legal and political culture and to shape
European society. The European trend towards neutrality is backed
by fear that the relationship between religion and human rights can
be conflictive and the belief that human rights can flourish only if the
two are kept separate.
It must be noted that it is extremely hard to follow all the
nuances of the word neutrality, and especially to distinguish
neutrality from “secularism.” 16 Neutrality is oftentimes described in
relation to secularism, 17 and even some opinions of the ECtHR use
neutrality and “secularism” interchangeably. 18 But scholars and
judges diverge in interpreting them as synonymous or as different
but related concepts. Also, “secularism can be understood in many
different ways; it is constitutional doctrine, a philosophical stance, a
worldview, and ideology, and even an extreme stance in the hands of
scientists who see religion as the archenemy.” 19 A debate about the
use of the word neutrality tends to become a debate about its very
meaning 20 or about its hostile or friendly implications for religious
freedom; 21 but this is not the debate this paper addresses. This
Article therefore adopts an introductive and minimalist
understanding of neutrality. This understanding is that neutrality is a
state’s attitude that in order to protect the religious freedom of

16. Rex Ahdar, Is Secularism Neutral?, 26 RATIO JURIS 3, 404 (2013); BAUBÉROT &
MILOT, supra note 2, at 151.
17. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269.
18. See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (Tulken, J.,
dissenting) (stating that she “fully and totally subscribe[s]” to the principles of secularism and
equality). “Secularism” is actually said to be a feature of Turkish constitutionalism, not of the
European Convention.
19. Lorenzo Zucca, Lautsi: A Commentary on a Decision by the ECtHR Grand
Chamber, Icon 111 INT’L J. CONST. L. 218, 222 (2013) [hereinafter ECtHR Grand
Chamber].
20. Rafael Palomino, Religion and Neutrality: Myth, Principle, and Meaning, 2011 BYU
L. REV. 657, 657 (“Neutrality faces [the] danger of turning into an ‘empty’ signifier, or,
alternatively, a word too ‘full’ of meanings.”).
21. Id. at 678.
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believers and nonbelievers, the state must not take a position in favor
of or against any religious view. 22
I. THE DEBATE OVER NEUTRALITY IN EUROPE: AN OVERVIEW
Neutrality is used at different levels of legal thinking and legal
practice. This Section highlights the most authoritative and
influential means of human rights’ protection in Europe at the
supranational level, namely the ECtHR. Then it considers the debate
about the religious nature and roots of the European Union. Lastly,
it briefly sketches how some national legal cultures—France, Italy
and Spain—that are characterized by a common linguistic heritage as
well as by a historically vibrant dialogue 23 have shaped similar
concepts of neutrality, albeit with uncertain results.
A. The Need for Neutrality in the European Court of Human Rights’
Case Law
The affirmation of neutrality in the decisions of the ECtHR is
highly relevant. It has become the most powerful and effective
institution patrolling the respect of the European Convention of
Human Rights (“Convention”) and securing fundamental liberties
among the members of the Council of Europe, which now includes
forty-seven member states. The ECtHR was meant to provide
European states with a common frame of basic liberties they were
expected to protect 24 after the horrible violations of human rights
and dignity that devastated the continent during the first half of the
twentieth century. The main influence was eminently political at first.
In a nutshell, it was based on the premise that “[w]hen governments
know that policies must be justified in an international forum[,] an
additional element enters their decision-making.” 25
In few words, the ECtHR’s case law has distilled the principle of
neutrality as a duty of the state to remain impartial in the field of
religion in order to establish equal freedom of religion and of

22. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269; ZUCCA, supra note 2, at xxi.
23. The relationship between language, communication, and political and institutional
dialogue has been notoriously explored by JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Beacon Press, 1981).
24. J.C. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2d ed., 1995).
25. Id. at 1.
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conscience. 26 Interestingly, though, Article 9 of the Convention,
which is the relevant provision as to religious freedom’s rights, does
not mention neutrality in any way. It provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.

Nor does article 14, which focuses on the prohibition of
discrimination, mentions neutrality:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.

26. Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (2000); Refah Partisi v.
Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 91 (2003);
Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, par. Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49 (2010); Leyla Sahin v.
Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 107 (2005); Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia
v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 123 (2001); Griechische Kirchengemeinde
Munchen und Beyern E.V. c. Allemagne, App. No. 52366/99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007); Sevgi
Kurtulmus v. Turkey, App. No. 65500/01, par. Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 2 (2006); 97 Members of the
Gidani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Georgia, App. No. 71156/01 par. Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 131 (2007); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia , App. No. 72881/01
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2006); Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, App. No. 77703/01
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 113 (2007); Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 184/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74
(2007); Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 302/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 99
(2010); Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 18147/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 72
(2007); Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 120 (2011); Hasan and
Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04 ¶ 54 (2007); Kervanci v. France, App. No.
31645/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2004); Mirolubovs v. Latvia, App. No. 798/05, par. Eur. Ct.
H.R. ¶ 80 (2009); Sinan Isik v. Turkey, App. No. 21924/05, par. Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45–46
(2010); Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2008); Gatis Kovalkovs v.
Latvia, App. No. 35021/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57 (2012); Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (2011); Jakobsky v. Poland, App. No. 18429/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 44
(2010); Ghazal c.v. France, App. No. 29134/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Sidincatul “Pastorul
Cel Bun” v. Romania, App. No. 2330/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 136 (2013); Fernández Martínez v.
Spain, App. No. 56030/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 128 (2014).
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Therefore, the ECtHR has utilized the principle of neutrality as a
hermeneutical device to enforce the principle of religious freedom,
although the Convention doesn’t command that the states be
neutral in order to protect religious freedom.
Some doubts can be cast on this interpretation of religious
freedom that includes neutrality. Such doubts arise from a historical
consideration of the framing of the conventional text (which I will
consider in Part I.A.1), from the utility of using neutrality as an
instrument that would be able to shed a light on cases before the
Court (Part I.A.2), and from the scattered states’ opposition to the
use of neutrality made by the ECtHR (Part I.A.3).
1. The framing of art. No. 9
Article 9 does not say anything about neutrality as we have seen
above. Moreover, records about the drafting of the Convention do
not lead to the conclusion that the drafters intended the wording of
the article to imply the principle of neutrality. 27 At the time of its
framing, the state parties debated about the breadth of religious
liberty as well as about its limits, but they did not debate a state’s
duty to be neutral towards religion in order to protect human rights.
On the contrary, Turkey wanted Article 9 to be flexible enough
to allow state institutions to intervene to protect democracy and
fundamental liberties against Islamic fundamentalists that supposedly
threatened Turkey’s republicanism. 28 Sweden insisted that the
wording had to allow states with an established church to preserve
their own regimes; Sweden was formally Lutheran and did not want
to find itself in violation of religious freedom as enshrined in the
Convention because of this affiliation. 29
The example of Sweden is significant. Sweden was but one of the
many European countries that could not call itself neutral at the time
the Convention was drafted: Sweden had a clear religious view. 30

27. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Travaux Préparatoires to the Convention,
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_TravPrep_Table_ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2014).
28. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (http://www.echr.coe.int/library/
DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART9-DH(56)14-EN1338892.pdf (last visited Aug. 22,
2013).
29. Id. at14.
30. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269.
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And this is still true for many countries. England has Anglicanism as
its established church; 31 Greece is formally Orthodox; 32 Scandinavian
countries have, or used to have an, established church; 33 Italy went
through a long era before leaving the establishment behind in
1984; 34 Ireland is Christian according to its constitutional
preamble; 35 the Constitution of Switzerland opens with an
invocation to God. 36
Therefore, there is no apparent reason for reading art. No. 9 of
the Convention as commanding state neutrality. 37 If neutrality means
state impartiality towards any religion, such that the state may have
no religious views, then many of these states are or used to be not
neutral. Had such states intended to implement neutrality through
framing or joining the European Convention, they would have
named themselves as plain violators of the Convention. In fact, this is
what Sweden feared at the time the Convention was being worded.
Therefore, an analysis of the wording and history of art. No. 9 of the
Convention does not help define the reasons for which leading cases
decided by the ECtHR actually used the concept of neutrality. On
the contrary, the wording and history of art. No. 9 could have
discouraged the ECtHR from using the concept of neutrality.
31. Act of Supremacy (1534), available at http://www.britainexpress.com/History/
tudor/supremacy-henry-text.htm.
32. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 2 (Greece).
33. KONGERIGET NORGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814, art. 4 (Nor.)
(“The King shall at all times profess the Evangelical-Lutheran religion.”). The Lutheran
Church was the established religion of Sweden until 2000. See Maari Jänterä-Jareborg,
Religion and the Secular State in Sweden, RELIGION AND SECULAR ST.: INTERIM REPS., 669,
669 (Int’l Ctr. for Law and Religion Studies, 669) http://www.iclrs.org/
content/blurb/files/Sweden.1.pdf. Finland has special provisions for the Lutheran Church in
its Constitution. See Suomen perustuslaki [Constitution] June 11, 1999, § 76). As for
Denmark, see Danmarks Riges Grundlov [Constitution] June 5, 1953 § 6.
34. The Constitutional Court’s decision no. 203 of 1989 clarified that Catholicism was
not the official religion of the state anymore, after the Lateran Pacts had been deeply modified
in 1984. Corte Cost., 12 aprile 1989, n. 203, GU n.16 del 19-4-1989 (It.), available at
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/vediMenuHTML?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=198
9-04-19&atto.codiceRedazionale=089C0422&tipoSerie=corte_costituzionale&tipoVigenza=
originario.
35. It runs as follows: “In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred.” Ir. Const.,
1937, pmbl.
36. “CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art.
72, ¶ 3 (Switz.) (“In the name of Almighty God!”).
37. But see Jeroen Temperman, Are State Churches Contrary to International Law?, 2
OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 119, 121 (2013).
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Moreover, the Turkish and Swedish examples also tell us
something more. The two countries recognized that there could be a
tension between the human rights they were protecting through the
Convention, and their country’s prevailing religious or anti-religious
attitudes. Turkey wanted to protect human rights, perhaps even at
the expense of religion. Sweden meant to protect its establishment of
religion, even at the expense of human rights. But they did not
resolve to strike a balance between religious freedom and human
rights through neutrality.
2. The equivocal use of neutrality in the ECtHR’s decisions
Neutrality was not included in the Convention, but the ECtHR
through its decisions later implemented it. If neutrality lies outside of
the perimeter of religious freedom as enshrined in the conventional
text, the ECtHR has inferred that art. No. 9 requires it. In several
pivotal cases that the ECtHR has decided, religious freedom is
undoubtedly an “asset” for democratic societies, and not just for
believers; religious freedom requires that the state keep a neutral
approach where neutrality is oftentimes placed alongside religious
“pluralism.” 38 The role of the state would consist in preserving
religious pluralism and granting as much freedom for religion and
human rights as possible, and this could be done only through state
neutrality. This reading of art. No. 9 interprets the Convention as a
living instrument 39 and not as a text that needs to be understood in
an originalist40 or textualist 41 fashion. The wording of article 9 would
be just the beginning of a long path that has led the meaning of the
38. Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 76 (2000); Dahlab v.
Suisse, App. No. 42393/0898 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No.
44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 104 (2005); Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 184/02 Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶ 54 (2007); 97 Members of the Gidani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Georgia,
App. No. 71156/01Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 132 (2007); Sinan Isik v. Turkey, App. No. 21924/05
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45 (2010); Bayatyan v. Armenia App. No. 23459/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 119
(2011).; Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 302/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 99
(2010); Mirolubovs v. Latvia, App. No. 798/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 80 (2009); Dogru v. France,
App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2008); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v.
Russia, App. No. 72881/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 82 (2004) (stating that
the European Convention is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions.”).
40. On originalism, see, among many, ORIGINALISM. A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., Regnery 2007).
41. Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
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Convention to encompass state neutrality.
The practice of assuming the Convention to include the state’s
duty of neutrality has led to a problematic line of case law that has
failed to establish a useful standard for interpreting difficult cases.
Sometimes, neutrality has been used to depict the state’s role in
preserving religious communities’ autonomy. For instance, the
ECtHR censored the Bulgarian 42 and Moldovan 43 attempts to
control Islamic and Orthodox communities’ affairs. Sometimes the
Court has legitimized restrictions on religious practices. Notably, it
allowed Turkey to forbid the use of hijab in universities, and
Switzerland and France to forbid the same garment for
schoolteachers 44 and students. 45 In other decisions, it was used both
to censor and to legitimize official religious symbols in the name of
human rights. The Lautsi case 46 is extremely relevant in this respect.
The first decision, which was released by a section of the ECtHR
(Lautsi I), decided that the presence of the crucifix in Italian public
classrooms was inconsistent with the state’s duty of neutrality; 47 the
final decision, which was made by the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber
(Lautsi II), decided that state neutrality allows the display of official
religious symbols. 48 Interestingly, the two decisions diverge in their
outcomes, but both use neutrality to scrutinize the relevant Italian
legislation. One could wonder why Lautsi II decided to uphold the
presence of the crucifix based on the same rationale of state
neutrality that Lautsi I offered.
42. Hasan v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
43. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 Eur. Ct. H.R
(2001).
44. Dahlab v. Suisse, App. No. 42393/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
45. Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Kervanci v. France,
App. No. 31645/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Ghazal v. France, App. No. 29134/08 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2009); Jasvir Singh v. France, App. No. 25463/08 Eur. Ct. H.R.(2009); Ranjit Singh
v. France, App. No. 27561/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Hatice Bayrak v. France, App. No.
14308/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Mahmud Sadek Gamaleddyn v. France, App. No. 18527/08
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Tuba Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
46. It was decided also on the basis of Additional Protocol of the Convention, which, in
art. No. 2, commands that “[n]o person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise
of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their
own religious and philosophical convictions.” Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11 Art. 2 , Council of
Europe, Nov. 1, 1998, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm.
47. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57 (2009).
48. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 72 (2011).
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On one hand, it is understandable why the use of neutrality by
the ECtHR is so nuanced and hardly predictable: 49 it has to conform
to state constitutional systems that diverge deeply, and
“accommodate a variety of national church-state arrangements,
including establishments.” 50 In some sense, the ECtHR has to find a
way to make neutrality virtually fit with France and its separation of
church and state, 51 as well with England, whose Head of State is the
Supreme Governor of the Anglican community. 52 And the ECtHR is
aware of this, having stated that when “questions concerning the
relationship between State and religions are at stake, in which
opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role
of the national decision-making body must be given special
importance.” 53
On the other hand, one can wonder why the ECtHR insists in
using neutrality, since its features do not offer guidance to policymakers and its implications are scarcely predictable. 54 It is not just
article 9’s wording; it is also the case law that casts doubts on the
opportunity of using neutrality.
3. The opposition to the ECtHR’s use of neutrality
The ECtHR’s use of neutrality is also contested for reasons that
derive both from the ambiguity of neutrality itself and from its
effects on national traditions. 55
Lautsi I was opposed by a vast number of countries that
criticized the decision and joined Italy in the appeal before the
Grand Chamber. Interestingly, almost all the countries that

49. Mark L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US
and Europe, 1 OXFORD J.L. AND RELIGION, 338 (2012) (offering a synthetic depiction of
neutrality in the ECtHR’s case law).
50. Id.
51. Gunn, supra note 14, at 419.
52. Act of Supremacy, supra note 31.
53. Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63 (2008); see also
Mirolubovs v. Latvia, App. No. 798/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 81 (2009); Murphy v. Ireland, App.
No. 44179/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 73 (2003); Sidincatul “Pastorul Cel Bun” v. Romania, App.
No. 2330/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2013).
54. Some believe that the use of this principle has become even more ambiguous with
the passing of time. Palomino, supra note 20, at 684.
55. See Temperman, supra note 37, at 126 (discussing the parallel need of the Human
Rights Committee of not undermining its own legitimation through focusing on the religious
freedom’s implications of establishment of religion).
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supported the appeal were Eastern European; 56 neutrality divided
Europe almost literally on that occasion. It confirmed that the
principle of neutrality is not a shared value throughout Europe, and
that especially Orthodox legal culture is not at ease with it. 57
Moreover, the decision was criticized for being partisan.
Professor Joseph Weiler, while advocating in favor of the display of
the crucifix in Lautsi II, 58 explained that neutrality is actually not
neutral. 59 Neutrality would be a legitimate, but not the only
legitimate, way of understanding religious liberty and striking a
balance between human rights and state-religion relationships. It
would be a constitutional option, which would coexist with other,
equally legitimate, options.
Whether this reading of neutrality is correct or not, one thing
can be stated quite easily: neutrality is not an appropriate foundation
for the protection of religion and human rights. The first reason lies
in its ambiguity: the way Lautsi I understood neutrality was opposite
to the way Lautsi II understood it. The second reason is that it has
as many supporters as detractors. Opponents of neutrality see it as a
militant political philosophy and theory of religious liberty 60—not
just as a mere neutral device that simply reflects religious pluralism
and religious freedom and that strikes a balance between religion,
state, and human rights in complete accordance with article 9 of the
European Convention.
The shift away from a textualist reading of the European
Convention and towards a political and philosophical reading of it is
particularly evident when the ECtHR occasionally uses the terms
neutrality and “secularism” interchangeably, indifferent to the

56. Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, Lithuania, Malta,
Monaco, Romania, and the Republic of San Marino. See NICOLA COLAIANNI, DIRITTO
PUBBLICO DELLE RELIGIONI. EGUAGLIANZA E DIFFERENZE NELLO STATO COSTITUZIONALE
97 (il Mulino, 2012).
57. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269.
58. See the transcription at Oral Submission by Professor Joseph Weiler Before the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, ILSUSSIDIARIO.NET (July 1, 2010),
http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Politics-Society/2010/7/1/EXCLUSIVE-OralSubmission-by-Professor-Joseph-Weiler-before-the-Grand-Chamber-of-the-European-Courtof-Human-Rights/96909/.
59. Id. See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Il crocefisso a Strasburgo: una decisione
“imbarazzante,” QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 148–52 (2010).
60. R. Palomino, supra note 20, at 671 (“Liberal neutrality is more inclined to favor
secular or laical world views over religious ones.”).
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distinct definition of each word. Though the ECtHR has decided
cases on the basis of neutrality rather than “secularism,” some Judges
of the ECtHR in their opinions have maintained that “secularism” is
a principle that is commanded by the Convention and that needs to
be enforced, safeguarded, and protected. 61 “Secularism” is a
trademark of countries like Turkey, and as I explained above, at the
time the Convention was drafted, Turkey meant to foster human
rights’ protection even at the expense of freedom of religion. 62
Turkey wasn’t really neutral: it was inclined to prefer human rights
to religion and religious rights.
Perhaps neutrality can be neutral. But as long as it is understood
as a militant political philosophy with specific priorities, or just as a
model of constitutionalism amongst the many, then it is not really
neutral, but instead it is divisive. It is therefore understandable that
even religious minorities living in states with an established religion
hardly support constitutional changes that would eliminate the
establishment 63 because they might fall into the arms of non-neutral
secularism. If the relationship between states, religions, and human
rights were reassessed and aligned with the principle of neutrality,
religious minorities believe that this realignment would happen at
the expense of all religions, not just of the established one.
Conversely, if neutrality is conceived in a nonsectarian way, it
becomes ambiguous and its consequences are unpredictable.
Since neutrality is an ambiguous word, the ECtHR’s adherence
to the principle of neutrality seems quite unexplainable as being
merely a consistent way to expound article 9 of the Convention. It is
all but evident why the ECtHR has placed neutrality within the core
of the conventional principles, since there is no trace in the text of
the Convention and there is no consensus amongst the state parties
on its existence and implications. 64

61. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (Tulken, J.,
dissenting).
62. ABDULLAH A.A. AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE 197 (2008).
63. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 145
(2005) (“[N]ot a single article or speech could be found by any non-Christian faith in favour
of disestablishment. Rather, secular reformers have been using minorities (claiming the desire
to accommodate them) to justify courses of action that these secular elites have decided upon
by themselves to advance their own purposes.”).
64. I am using the categories that Charles H. Beitz has articulated in his book.
CHARLES H. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 75–76 (2009).
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B. The Secular-Christian European Union Debate
A relevant legal debate that took place some years ago in Europe
helps illuminate the reasons underpinning the adoption of neutrality
by the European legal culture. It was the debate about the European
Union’s identity and legacy at the moment the EU drafted a
constitution.
EU law has seldom addressed human rights issues directly, and
has not grounded its legitimation upon them explicitly. 65 The scope
of EU law, however, is expanding to reflect an increasing interest in
human rights and also to encompass religious freedom among its
policies. 66 In the EU context, ideas about neutrality, secularism, and
religiosity were strongly debated at the momentous time of the
drafting of the European Union’s constitutional text. Interestingly,
those were the years in which, after the delivery of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2000 67 and after
experiencing the entrance of several post-Socialist Eastern European
countries, the EU was wondering about its further expansion and the
inclusion of Turkey. The EU was reflecting and pondering what kind
of new constitutional framework was most needed. 68 The
Constitution was expected to consolidate the new status and set the
premises for the EU’s future commitment to human rights. The
drafting of a “new European Constitution” was meant to
“contribute to European social integration, to enhance a common
65. J.H.H. Weiler, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration:
An Exploratory Essay, in Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 150 (J. Dickson,
P. Eleftheriadis eds., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).
66. See Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection
of Freedom of Religion or Belief, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (24 June 2013),
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137585.pdf.
Religious freedom is also protected by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, as incorporated in the Treaty on European Union, under art. No. 17:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. The right to conscientious objection is recognized, in accordance with the
national laws governing the exercise of this right.
67. It was ratified December 7, 2000. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.
68. J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg, available at
https://infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/files/database/000036001-000037000/000036583.pdf (last
visited Nov. 10, 2013).
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European identity, and to remedy the deficit in democratic
legitimacy,” which were commonly considered some of the weakest
aspects of the EU entity. 69
The EU Constitution was later turned down as it took the more
favored form of a Treaty. 70 Nonetheless, the debates about what was
appropriate to write in the EU Constitutional Preamble are still
significant to understanding the debate between pro- and antineutrality European scholars. The debate about the EU Constitution
concerned the identity, the past, and the founding values of the EU
and of modern Europe, but this debate was relevant for the future of
the EU. 71 The debate was about what should have been written in
the Preamble, and about what had inspired the reconstruction of
Europe after hundreds of years of wars. 72 Although the debate did
not lead to the delivery of an official text, that debate shed a light on
the narratives that describe contemporary political Europe.
The drafting of the Preamble initially led to a proposal that did
not highlight the religious roots of the EU, 73 but rather blended
them into a broader, humanistic perspective:
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist
inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilizations of
Greece and Rome, characterized by spiritual impulse always present
in its heritage and later by the philosophical currents of the
Enlightenment, has embedded within the life of society its
perception of the central role of the human person and his
inviolable and inalienable rights, and of respect for law. 74

The focus was on humanism. Religions were left out of the text.
Humanism was the key, the historical climax to which previous
traditions—including Christianity—had contributed. Religions were
69. José Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,
(June 29, 2004), http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2004-07-29-casanova-en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
70. See supra note 16.
71. J. HABERMAS, SOLIDARIETÀ TRA ESTRANEI: INTERVENTI SU FATTI E NORME 39 (L.
Ceppa, Guerini e Associati, 1997) (noting that our identity has to do with our past as well as
with our projects).
72. Casanova, supra note 69, at 3.
73. Text European Convention pmbl., May 28, 2003, Secretariat, CONV 722/03,
available at http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/reg/en/03/cv00/cv00722.en03.pdf
(last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
74. The
European
Convention,
May
28,
2003,
available
at
http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/b_290503.pdf.
EUROZINE10
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important because they had nurtured the modern culture of human
rights. That was the role of religions that could be valued; including
religious traditions, or naming them in the Preamble, would have
been discriminatory and clearly non-neutral. 75
Joseph Weiler opposed this view. In a small book, A Christian
Europe, 76 which was translated in several languages but never
published for an English-speaking audience, Weiler advocated the
role of religious culture in the shaping of contemporary Europe and
stated that the overwhelmingly Christian culture needed to be
openly recognized by the EU Constitution. If a Preamble was to be
included in the Constitution, then it had to include Christianity
among the EU inspirational movements. An inclusive constitutional
text had to include Christianity, instead of excluding it for the sake
of neutrality: its exclusion would have been ideological and divisive.
Weiler was not alone. Some other prominent thinkers, such as
José Casanova, supported the idea that the exclusion of religious
views in the European Constitution was blatantly upholding a
secularist (i.e., nonreligious), and therefore not neutral, ideal of
Europe and of the Constitution, which turned “religion into a
problem.” 77
Weiler’s proposal lost. The “neutral” version of it was adopted,
albeit deeply modified: all the historical and philosophical references
were dropped. 78 When the constitutional project was replaced with
what was called the Lisbon Treaty, the last version of the Preamble
was substantially included in it. 79
Interestingly, Weiler’s proposal in A Christian Europe was
responded to by Lorenzo Zucca’s A Secular Europe 80 some years
75. SECULAR EUROPE, supra note 2, at 41.
76. JOSEPH WEILER, UN’EUROPA CRISTIANA. UN SAGGIO ESPLORATIVO (Rizzoli,
2003).
77. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 11.
78. European Convention Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18,
2003,
Secretariat,
CONV
850/03,
available
at
http://europeanconvention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (“Drawing inspiration from the cultural,
religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, the values of which, still present in its heritage,
have embedded within the life of society the central role of the human person and his or her
inviolable and inalienable rights, and respect for law.”).
79. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 15, at 10 (“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the
cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the
universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom,
democracy, equality and the rule of law.”).
80. SECULAR EUROPE, supra note 2.
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later. Zucca addresses the problematic public role of religion in
Europe, dealing with the issues of the EU’s identity as well as with
the ECtHR’s case law. Zucca still advocates neutrality, although he
insists that it should be understood in a practical, non-theoretical
way. He argues that neutrality does not need to be articulated in a
philosophical fashion, but only as a practical concept. 81 Instead of
being a belief, it should be just an attitude; 82 it is just intended to
protect European societies, since “religion is very much interested in
the social game. It wants to conquer the people.” 83 In Zucca’s
theory, religion is trying to conquer the state and the society, and
this could compromise the possibility of securing human rights’
effective respect in a pluralistic environment. 84 It is worth noticing
that, for Zucca, the only available answer to this threat would consist
of a kind of neutrality made up of “inclusive secularism,” 85 an
expression that formally does not place any boundaries between
neutrality and any anti-religious approach, and surely does not make
it palatable to all European identities.
Recently, Jürgen Habermas has emphasized the perils of
misunderstanding neutrality and pushing religious people out of the
public sphere against their will. 86 With the end of the Iron Curtain
and the intensification of intra-European cultural and political
exchanges, the potential adverse impact of this misunderstanding has
expanded to Eastern Europe. In fact, the processes of secularization
that have dominated, in different shapes, Protestant and Catholic
countries of Europe 87 are largely unknown to the Orthodox world. 88
The Orthodox world is therefore not at ease with such categories of
secularization, “secularism” and neutrality. All things considered,
neutrality offers a vision that is not truly shared by the overwhelming
European legal culture: it is conceived differently by countries that
accept it, while it is even rejected by other European peoples.
81. Id. at 101.
82. Id. at 101.
83. Id. at 41.
84. Id. at 132 (“If the rule of law was contaminated by any type of cultural and religious
influence it would hardly be capable of coping with diversity.”).
85. Id. at xx.
86. JÜRGEN HABERMAS & EDUARDO MENDIETA, LE RELIGIONI E LA POLITICA.
ESPRESSIONI DI FEDE E DECISIONI PUBBLICHE 40 (2013).
87. J. Remy, Laïcité et construction de l’Europe, in RELIGIONS ET TRANSFORMATIONS
DE L’EUROPE, 367–69 (G. Vincent & J.P. Willaime eds., 1993).
88. MASSIGNON & RIVA, supra note 12, at 269.
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Therefore, it can be embraced by the European legal culture only if
it is understood in a very loose sense. But, if this is the way it is
conceived, it does not help in deciding cases.
C. Non-Secular States Moving Towards Neutrality: The Case of Italy
and Spain
Interestingly, the success of the principle of neutrality is not
confined to the supranational level. It can be traced also in some
relevant national contexts. I will briefly consider here two state legal
systems that made their own way towards neutrality, namely Italy and
Spain, when they reshaped the relationship between the state and
religion when they reflected on their human rights protections. While
framing their own constitutional texts, they did not follow the model
of the French Constitution, 89 which required a strong separation of
church and state. 90 Nevertheless, Italy and Spain later utilized French
concepts and wordings when they interpreted them. 91
During the Constitutional Assembly, the Italian Framers openly
affirmed that they did want to mention the word “laicità,” the
equivalent of French “laïcité,” which is oftentimes assimilated or at
least strictly linked to neutrality. 92 The Italian Framers avoided this
word because they did not want to communicate any hostility
towards religion. 93 The constitutional commitment to human rights
did not mean anti-religiosity. No other expression of somewhat
equivalent meaning, such as neutrality, or “secularism,” was included
in the text.
More generally, both Italian 94 and Spanish 95 constitutionalism
led to an open affirmation of religious freedom and human rights on

89. 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and
social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised
basis.”).
90. Silvio Ferrari, Civil Religions: Models and Perspectives, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
749, 751 (2010).
91. R. Palomino, supra note 20, at 661.
92. J. Baubérot & M. Milot, Laïcités sans frontiers 77 (2011).
93. See the declaration of the Framer, Hon. Cevolotto, November 21, 1946, 418 of the
Records of the First Subcommission of the Italian Constituent Assembly, available at
http://www.camera.it/_dati/costituente/lavori/I_Sottocommissione/sed041/sed041.pdf.
94. Art. 7 COSTITUZIONE [Cost.] (It.) (“The State and the Catholic Church are
independent and sovereign, each within its own sphere. Their relations are regulated by the
Lateran pacts. Amendments to such Pacts which are accepted by both parties shall not require

622

DO NOT DELETE

605

8/12/2015 10:26 AM

Does Europe Need Neutrality?

an equal basis, as well as of a special relationship between the state
and the Catholic faith. Nonetheless, the enactment of the
constitutional texts in both states led the respective constitutional
courts to explicitly mention the principle of neutrality. 96 The Italian
Constitutional Court did so starting in 1989, 97 only after the end of
the established church regime. In 1984, the pacts between the
Catholic Church and the state were renewed and the establishedchurch regime, which had never been questioned after 1848 and had
probably survived the drafting of the 1948 Constitution, was openly
abandoned. 98 The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal affirmed
“neutralidad” (neutrality in Spanish) a little earlier, in 1981. 99 The
two states, which had refused to endorse the French model of
neutrality at the time of drafting their constitutions, 100 later followed
France and borrowed the word neutrality. 101
The two courts’ declarations that their respective states are
“neutral” say more than what the two states actually enforce.
the procedure of constitutional amendments.”); id. at art. 8 (“All religious denominations are
equally free before the law. Denominations other than Catholicism have the right to selforganisation according to their own statutes, provided these do not conflict with Italian law.
Their relations with the State are regulated by law, based on agreements with their respective
representatives.”); id. at art. 19 (“Anyone is entitled to freely profess their religious belief in
any form, individually or with others, and to promote them and celebrate rites in public or in
private, provided they are not offensive to public morality.”).
95. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Freedom of ideology, religion and
worship is guaranteed, to individuals and communities with no other restriction on their
expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law. No one may be
compelled to make statements regarding his or her ideology, religion or beliefs. No religion
shall have a state character. The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs of
Spanish society and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation relations with the
Catholic Church and other confessions.”).
96. Alessandro Ferrari, Laïcité et multiculturalisme à l’italienne, 141 ARCHIVES DE
SCIENCES SOCIALES DES RELIGIONS 133, 133 (2008).
97. Corte cost., 12 aprile 1989, n. 203, Racc. uff. Corte cost.
98. Agreements made on February 18 and November 15, 1984 and executed with law
no. 121 and 206 in 1985. Legge 25 marzo 1985, n. 121 (It.); Legge 20 maggio 1985, n. 206
(It.). See the additional protocol to the February 18, 1984 Agreement, available at
http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/accordo_indice.html#3.
99. S.T.C.
005,
1981
(B.J.C.,
No.
5)
(Spain),
available
at
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/paginas/Sentencia.aspx?cod=16631.
100. Carmen Garcimartín Montero, La laicidad en las Cortes Constituyentes de 1978, 36
IUS CANONICUM, 539, 558 (1996).
101. M.A. Roca, La neutralidad del Estado: fundamento doctrinal y actual delimitación
en la jurisprudencia, IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO, 405–29 (1997); B. Randazzo, La Corte
«apre» al giudizio di uguaglianza tra confessioni religiose?, GIURISPRUDENZA
COSTITUZIONALE, 1843–67 (1998).
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Neutrality is hardly descriptive of the constitutional balance between
religious liberty, equality, and state impartiality that they have
offered. Decisions and policies are not offered a clear guidance
through this concept. Again, the display of the crucifix is a good
example. In Italy, in 2000 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di
Cassazione”) found the display of the crucifix in ballot rooms to be
inconsistent with the state’s duty of neutrality; 102 it did not order its
removal only because it is not among its powers to issue such an
order. In 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court (“Consiglio di
Stato”), deciding the case that later brought the Lautsi controversy
before the ECtHR, affirmed that it is reasonable to hang the crucifix
in classrooms because it is not only consistent with the principle of
neutrality, but it also represents the historical root of neutrality
itself. 103 In this latter Court opinion, Christian culture, with its
command of giving what is God’s to God and what is Caesar’s to
Caesar, provided the seeds for what would later develop as the
culture of religious freedom and of separation between church
and state. 104
In Spain, the display of the crucifix in public schools was
discussed twice. The first decision found the display in violation of
the principle of state neutrality; 105 the appellate decision struck a
different balance between religious freedom, neutrality and the
display of the crucifix. It commanded that the display of the crucifix
accommodate the students’ needs and, more concretely, the actual
existence of opponents of such display. 106 Classroom crucifixes
needed to be removed only upon request of the students (or of their
parents) who were actually attending classes in the relevant
classrooms. 107 On the contrary, crucifixes displayed in common
rooms were under the sight of the general public and therefore had
to be removed entirely. 108
These short examples of states that have made no textual
reference to neutrality in their constitutions but that have endorsed it
102. Cass., IV sez. Penale (IV Penal Law session), 1 gennaio 2000, n. 439, available at
http://web.unife.it/convegni/amicuscuriae/index_file/cassazione439.pdf.
103. Cons. Stato, sez. VI, 13 febbraio 2006, n. 556, Giur. it.
104. Id.
105. S. Juz. Cont. Adm., 2008 (J.T.S., No. 228) (Spain).
106. S.T.S.J., Dec. 14, 2009 (J.T.S.) (Spain).
107. Holding no. 1 of the judgment.
108. Holding no. 2 of the judgment.
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in the decisions of their judges are of some interest. The circulation
of neutrality proves the success of this concept; but its use is
ambiguous. It is not clear why and how the Italian and the Spanish
constitutional tribunals resolved to adopt this principle,
notwithstanding its roots, which are hostile to religion. Nor has this
principle been useful in deciding cases as is evident from the fact that
neutrality has led to opposing decisions about the legitimacy of the
display of the crucifix even within the same state. Its fortune
probably contributed to the circulation of the concept of neutrality,
but affected the clarity of its meaning. It has been endorsed and
utilized by legal systems with different attitudes towards the
relationship between church and state, religious freedom and law and
religion, to the extent that its implications have become hardly
predictable.
Therefore, the success of the principle of neutrality needs
clarification. The most needed clarification regards the reason that
has led legal doctrine and courts to use it, notwithstanding all the
criticism that such use has attracted. After all, the use of neutrality
has been rightly criticized for being either elusive—think about
Lautsi II 109—or for being too rigid and close to French and Turkish
secularism—think about Lautsi I. 110 This leads us to the core of this
article: the reasons behind the Europe-wide fortune of neutrality.
II. WHY EUROPEAN LEGAL THOUGHT IS TRYING TO ENFORCE
NEUTRALITY: THE QUEST FOR A EUROPEAN IDENTITY
The reason for the successful expansion of the principle of
neutrality cannot be found in the ECtHR as well as domestic Courts’
decisions. The decisions actually use neutrality but do not explain
why they do so.
It seems that neutrality keeps popping up in the case law of the
ECtHR, in some domestic courts’ decisions, and in the debate about
the historical and philosophical roots of Europe because the
European legal culture is in search of a founding myth for its public
philosophy and for its identity. 111 The debate about the Preamble of
the Constitution of Europe ended in a failure—the Preamble was
109. ECtHR Grand Chamber, supra note 19, at 229.
110. Zoe Luca, Religious Symbols in Public Schools and the (Lack of) Margin of
Appreciation, 17 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 98 (2010).
111. R. Palomino, supra note 20, at 658.
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largely emptied to make it palatable to different states’ cultures, and
the Constitution’s project was finally supplanted with a more
moderate Treaty. But the debate is still there: what constitute a
European identity? 112 What is the European model for the
relationship between religion, state, and human rights? 113
This is a subject that has been raised by influential thinkers such
as Jürgen Habermas, who has denounced the critical situation of a
European culture that would have abdicated its great common ideals
for a moderate, mild governance of economic and social problems. 114
Thinkers like Habermas believe that only a daring, philosophically
committed European legal culture would be able to address the lack
of great ideals and respond to the urgent need for a European
“soul,” which would restore the solidarity amongst Europeans. And
scholars such as John Milbank believe that only a pervasive Christian
culture would be responsive to these needs and they therefore argue
against the project of neutrality. 115
As fielded by Habermas, the problem of a shared understanding
of a collective identity in the field of the relationship between church
and state in Europe must be considered as merely a part of a huge
debate about the role of European supranational institutions, 116 on
their ultimate goals, and on their effectiveness in enforcing a shared
human rights’ policy in Europe. 117 The identity of Europe is
problematic not just regarding the relationship between religion and
human rights, but also in the field of human rights itself. The
recourse to neutrality must be understood as a part of a reliable
response to the quest for European identity when it comes to the
relationship between law, religion, human rights, and democracy
broadly considered.
This quest for an identity is not only a European issue. It can
112. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 1.
113. Jean-Paul Willaime, La Sécularisation. Une Exception Européenne? Retour sur un
concept et sa discussion en sociologie des religions, 47 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE, 755,
765 (2006).
114. For instance, see Jürgen Habermas, Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line
with the Integration of States, 18 EURO. L.J. 485, 486 (2012).
115. John Milbank, Shari’a and the True Basis of Group Rights, in SHARI’A IN THE WEST
138 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010); Remy, supra note 87, at 378.
116. Jürgen Habermas, Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis, available at
http://www.kuleuven.be/communicatie/evenementen/evenementen/jurgenhabermas/democracy-solidarity-and-the-european-crisis (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
117. BEITZ, supra note 64, at 14.
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also be found at a state level. States such as Italy or Spain have left
established-church regimes behind. It is not by chance that both
Italy and Spain introduced what they later called neutrality into their
constitutional framework only after the end of the previous
established or quasi-established religious regimes. 118 The special
relationship they had with Catholicism was a powerful tool of
legitimization. 119 After this special relationship was over, Italy and
Spain started looking for another identity: something that would
describe their contemporary constitutionalism with regard to
religious liberty and other human rights. They thought they found it
in the myth of neutrality.
This exploration so far leads to the preliminary conclusion that
neutrality must be understood as an attempt to respond to the quest
for a European “soul;” this is why it has been widely and increasingly
utilized, even though the state and supranational constitutional
framework in Europe would be too poor and even contradictory to
ground its use.
Nonetheless, neutrality is not the right solution for this quest.
Three reasons that have been explored lie behind this conclusion: (a)
neutrality is not referenced in the text of the European Convention
of Human Rights, in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, or in
many state constitutions; (b) neutrality does not fit easily with the
established-church regimes that populate Europe; and (c) the legal
implications of neutrality are ambiguous. Therefore, I briefly explore
an alternative solution here.
III. THE SURVIVAL OF THE POST-WESTPHALIAN EUROPE AND THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Had European legal culture looked for a substitute of neutrality,
would they have found a real alternative in religious pluralism? After
all, neutrality has oftentimes accompanied “religious pluralism,” 120 at
least in the ECtHR’s case law, as seen above. The contemporary
European state should be serving and protecting religious pluralism
118. Gustavo Suárez Pertierra, Laicidad y cooperación como bases del modelo español: un
intento de interpretación integral (y una nueva plataforma de consenso), 92 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA
DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 41, 42–43 (2011).
119. R. Robertson, Globalization, Politics, and Religion, in THE CHANGING FACE OF
RELIGION 19 (James A. Beckford & Thomas Luckmann eds., 1989).
120. See Silvio Ferrari, I simboli religiosi nello spazio pubblico, 2012 QUADERNI DI
DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 317, 327.
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under article 9 of the European Convention, notwithstanding the
fact that the wording of art. No. 9 does not mention “religious
pluralism.”
The ECtHR is not alone in fostering this idea of religious
pluralism as the environment in which European states should find
their place. A wide range of constitutional law scholars, 121 political
theorists, and even protagonists of the contemporary religious
thinking 122 have also supported reasonably similar ideas of a “plural
society,” in which public institutions are expected to preserve and
cherish religious pluralism as an important asset for European and
national societies. 123 A pluralistic society, which understands religious
heterogeneity as a positive aspect of contemporary European
democracies, has therefore been proposed as a model for
contemporary European legal systems. Different voices have been
speaking along these lines.
Nonetheless, two reasons play against this identifying power of
religious pluralism as a description of contemporary Europe as well
as a legal concept that should be enforced at the state level. The first
reason is that states are not religiously plural. Many of them are
mainly composed of a vast religious majority, which is surrounded by
a number of other small religions—increasingly so because of
immigration—and by an increasing number of secularized people,
who do not embrace any faith. 124 More generally, “[t]hroughout
Europe, historically dominant churches, even those churches that
have been officially disestablished, continue to exert disproportionate
social influence.” 125 Actually, if one considers the majoritarian
religions that populate Europe, they are still distributed along
Westphalia Peace lines. Religious pluralism is not the veritable
description of the current status of Europe; the usage of this
expression within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence can be understood
instead as a call on European citizens and institutions, to make them

121. Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Stato e Chiesa. Cittadini e cattolici, 2007 DIRITTO PUBBLICO
697.
122. ANGELO SCOLA, UNA NUOVA LAICITÀ. TEMI PER UNA SOCIETÀ PLURALE (Marsilio,
Padova, 2007).
123. Among many, see Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 184/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54
(2007).
124. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 10.
125. Mark L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US
and Europe, 1 OXFORD J.L. AND RELIGION 338 (2012).
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committed to protect religious freedom and to welcome the
proliferation of religious minorities. 126
Religious pluralism is not well received by some states also for
another reason. In some cases, religious identities are still understood
as European states’ foundations. Even the recent dissolution of
Yugoslavia has taken place along religious lines. 127 Cyprus is still
divided into two, both ethnically and religiously. 128 Northern
Ireland’s political conflict coupled the Protestant-Catholic conflict
until recently. 129 religious pluralism can be seen as problematic in
these environments, since it can affect state identity and even
regional stability.
The German domestic struggle about the crucifix confirms that,
where there is no religious homogeneity, religion becomes a matter
of debate even within well-settled European states, 130 whose survival
and social equilibrium is not at stake. The presence of the crucifix in
classrooms has recently been accommodated along religious lines.
The southern, mostly Catholic, Bayer has traditionally allowed the
display of the symbol. The predominantly Protestant regions do not

126. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), “[f]or the next three hundred years,
European societies continued exporting all their religious minorities overseas, while the
confessional territorial boundaries between Catholic and Protestant and between Lutheran and
Calvinist remained basically frozen until the drastic secularization of post-World War II
European societies made those confessional boundaries seemingly irrelevant.
In fact, without taking into account this long historical pattern of confessionalization of states,
peoples and territories, it is not possible to understand the difficulties which every continental
European state has, irrespective of the fact whether they have maintained formal establishment
or are constitutionally secular, and the difficulties which every European society has, the most
secular as well as the most religious ones, in accommodating religious diversity, and particularly
in incorporating immigrant religions.16 It is true that in the last two hundred years all
European states underwent some process of secularization and today all of them are formally
and/or substantively secular. But the pattern of caesaro-papist regulation and control of
religion established by the early modern confessional absolutist state, - by Catholic, Anglican,
Lutheran, Calvinist, and Orthodox alike - has been maintained, basically unchallenged, until
the present:” José Casanova, Public Religion Revisited, in RELIGION: BEYOND THE CONCEPT
(Hent de Vries ed., 2008), available at http://dev.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/
default/files/religionseminar_jcasanova.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
127. VJEKOSLAV PERICA, BALKAN IDOLS. RELIGION AND NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAV
STATES 3 (2002,); Grace Davie, RELIGION IN MODERN EUROPE. A MEMORY MUTATES 4
(2002).
128. ACHILLES C. EMILIANIDES, RELIGION AND LAW IN CYPRUS 60 (2011).
129. TONY FAHEY, BERNADETTE C. HAYES, R & RICHARD SINNOTT, CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS: A STUDY OF VALUES AND ATTITUDES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND
NORTHERN IRELAND 75 (2005).
130. J. Casanova, supra note 69, at 2.
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permit such display. 131 And the Federal Constitutional Court, when
asked to address this topic, took what has been defined as a
“Protestant” approach; 132 namely, the Court affirmed state neutrality
and added that the display of the crucifix in public places would
profane the religious meaning of the symbol 133 (interestingly, this
argument has been used in Protestant environments, whereas it is
quite uncommon within Catholic culture). 134 In the aftermath of the
Federal Court’s decision, Bayer has accommodated the presence of
the crucifix, but substantially kept it. The German legal culture is
therefore somewhat divided along religious lines.
The real historical alternative to a homogeneous religious
environment has been to get away from religion: namely, to enforce
a rigid separation—or even a control—of the state towards
religions. 135 This is obviously the case in France, but it is also the
case in Turkey, whose republic was born out of internal conflicts
within different strands of Islamic political doctrine. 136
But the exportation of the model of neutrality, from secularist
countries like France to other European States and to all of
Europe—through European Union law and the ECtHR’s
jurisprudence—has proven to be delusive for several reasons. It does
not respect the phrasing of the European Convention, nor does it
mirror the constitutional identity of several European states. And
even genuine supporters of neutrality probably would not recognize
Lautsi II as a decision that respects this principle.
Neutrality, as a distinct secularist political and legal identity, can

131. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (2011) (“In Germany the
Federal Constitutional Court has ruled that a similar Bavarian ordinance was contrary to the
principle of the state’s neutrality and difficult to reconcile with the freedom of religion of
children who were not Catholics (16 May 1995; BVerfGE 93, 1). The Bavarian parliament
then issued a new ordinance maintaining the previous measure, but enabling parents to cite
their religious or secular convictions in challenging the presence of crucifixes in the classrooms
attended by their children and introducing a mechanism whereby, if necessary, a compromise
or a personalised solution could be reached.”).
132. Francesco Patruno, Riflessioni sul valore delle pronunce straniere in tema di
esposizione del crocifisso, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (Nov. 30, 2003), available at
www.forumcostituzionale.it.
133. Francesco Patruno, Crocifisso, giurisprudenza straniera e laicità, available at
www.olir.it (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
134. Paolo Cavana, La questione del crocifisso in Italia, available at www.olir.it (last
visited Oct. 2, 2013).
135. BAUBÉROT & MILOT, supra note 3, at 70.
136. AN-NA’IM, supra note 62 at 199.
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play this role in countries that have clearly embraced it, not in those
that are not familiar with it. Such countries would not accept it for
themselves or at a continental level.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is not a given that an alternative to neutrality is really
necessary. The shaping of a shared European identity does not need
to encompass all the aspects that characterize European states,
including religion and religious freedom. After all, even the EU did
not want to replicate a state at a bigger level, imposing a single
standardized model of statehood to all the state parties. 137 The EU
experiment strived to create a new level of government, whose
components do not necessarily parallel those of states.
A fresh look at the concept of religious pluralism can provide a
framework for the European quest for identity in the religious field.
Religious pluralism can play this role, insofar it is not understood as
applicable at the state level. Single states could find religious
pluralism a concept hard to handle.
Religious pluralism presupposes heterogeneity and therefore
cannot play the integrating role that each single religion did in
shaping modern European states. But it can still have a role in
shaping the European identity, precisely because the identity of
Europe is not to be compared to the states’ identities. 138 Europe is
new in this respect. EU and the European Council’s institutions
were born out of peoples that did not want to annihilate each other
in the name of a specific identity or national sovereignty. 139 They
wanted to be inclusive and therefore avoided cutting off each other’s
identities. Europe needs a new understanding of its relationship with
religion because it needs an understanding of human rights that is
137. Armin von Bogdandy, Doctrine of Principles, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9, 2003,
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/030901-01.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2014).
138. Democracy, supra note 116, at 488 “(“Neither can this cautious posture be justified
with the familiar arguments that all integration efforts are ultimately condemned to failure by
the lack of a European people or the lack of a European public. Concepts such as nation or
Volk evoke images of homogeneous macrosubjects. [. . .] What we have to recto with in
Europe today are not imaginary peoples but concrete nation-states, linguistic diversity and
national publics.”).
139. Charles F. Sabel & Oliver Gerstenberg, Constitutionalising an Overlapping
Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order¸ 16 EUR. L.J. 511,
512 (2010).
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inclusive of different human rights’ national standards and “does not
rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral
doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the
like” 140 that can be easier found on a state scale. Religious pluralism
could be part of the fabric of the European identity that European
legal culture is looking for. 141
If religious pluralism is taken seriously by the European legal
culture at the Continental level, then states can also learn from it. 142
The states were born out of religious crucibles, but are facing
growing secularization and immigration. 143 Perhaps they could
prospectively look at Europe to draw inspiration to adjust their
identity to new demands of inclusion coming from cultures they are
not familiar with. If Europe is able to take religious pluralism on as
part of its own identity, then perhaps states can learn and imitate it
voluntarily. If not, Europe (both the EU and the ECtHR) will
probably enforce rights and political agendas based on a rather
selective neutrality, which does not really incorporate “religious
pluralism,” but which leads to the “refusal to have religion stand as
the symbol of national identity” (an identity that defines many
European countries), 144 and which leans towards a “secularized
religion of humanity” 145 that tends to replace religious values with
other abstract values. 146
Since there is no agreement on the meaning of “secularism” and
on its connection with neutrality, and since the use of neutrality is
associated with a political ideal that characterizes only some of the
European states, 147 enforcing neutrality through EU and the ECtHR
would not be conducive to the implementation of a shared European
identity. Rather, enforcing neutrality would be detrimental.
The same risk can be run if the European legal culture pushes for
140. Id. at 513.
141. Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human
Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 745 (2011).
142. PETER HÄBERLE, COSTITUZIONE E IDENTITÀ CULTURALE. TRA EUROPA E STATI
NAZIONALI 13 (2006) (reflects upon a pluralism of identities that would be characteristic both
of Europe and of the modern constitutional states).
143. Casanova, supra note 69, at 6.
144. András Sajó, Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism, 6 3–4, INT’L J.
CONST. L. 605, 629 (2008).
145. Democracy, supra note 116.
146. BAUBÉROT & MILOT, supra note 2, at 12.
147. J. Remy, supra note 88, at 367.
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the enforcement of religious pluralism at a state level: religious
pluralism is not a given for many European states, and can even
jeopardize their stability, if it is imposed on them. If the EU and the
ECtHR impose religious pluralism on themselves, and understand that
the European quest for identity is inherently pluralistic and does not
coincide with embracing a single church and state model, then they
can both respect state identity and itself in a newer, more respectful,
fashion. They can even inspire states’ evolution, delicately pushing
them towards the implementation of “religious pluralism.” After all,
the fortune of EU rests on “a political culture which internalizes,
especially public authorities, obedience to the law rather than to
expediency,” on a rather voluntary basis, not on “a gun or
coercion.” 148 If this has happened so far with regards to the shaping
of EU, it could work also with “religious pluralism.”

148. Weiler, supra note 65, at 154.
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